The strength of strict churches is neither a historical coincidence nor a statistical artifact. Strictness makes organizations stronger and more attractive because it reduces free riding. It screens out members who lack commitment and stimulates participation among those who remain. Rational choice theory thus explains the success of sects, cults, and conservative denominations without recourse to assumptions of irrationality, abnormality, or misinformation. The theory also predicts differences between strict and lenient groups, distinguishes between effective and counterproductive demands, and demonstrates the need to adapt strict demands in response to social change.
markets? As Kelley pointed out, the question is not merely one of survival; religious groups that demand such sacrifices are more successful than those that do not.3 I shall argue that strict demands "strengthen" a church in three ways: they raise overall levels of commitment, they increase average rates of participation, and they enhance the net benefits of membership. These strengths arise because strictness mitigates free-rider problems that otherwise lead to low levels of member commitment and participation. Free riders threaten most collective activities, and religious activities are no exception. Church members may attend services, call upon the pastor for counsel, enjoy the fellowship of their peers, and so forth, without ever putting a dollar in the plate or bringing a dish to the potluck. Direct monitoring (of attendance, contributions, and other overt behaviors) fails to solve the problem because it tends to undermine critical group attributes such as commitment, enthusiasm, and solidarity. But seemingly unproductive costs provide an indirect solution. These costs screen out people whose participation would otherwise be low, while at the same time they increase participation among those who do join. As a consequence, apparently unproductive sacrifices can increase the utility of group members. Efficient religions with perfectly rational members may thus embrace stigma, self-sacrifice, and bizarre behavioral standards. Strictness works.
HOW STRICTNESS LEADS TO STRENGTH
Religion is a social phenomenon, born and nurtured among groups of people. In principle, perhaps, religion can be purely private, but in practice it appears to be much more compelling and attractive when experienced in groups.4 In the austere but precise language of economics, religion is a "commodity" that people produce collectively. My religious satisfaction thus depends both on my "inputs" and on those of others.
3 This pattern of success appears well beyond the confines of contemporary Protestantism. Rosabeth Kanter in her classic study of 19th-century utopian communities found that successful communes demanded much greater sacrifices of time, energy, and money than did unsuccessful ones (Kanter 1973; Hall 1988 ). The Mormon church has distinctive behavioral requirements and makes heavy demands on members' time and money, yet is the fastest growing religion of the modern era (Stark 1984) . And one cannot ignore the continuing importance of fundamentalism worldwide (Lawrence 1989) . 4 Since Christianity, Islam, and Judaism place greater emphasis on collective, congregational activity than do Buddhism, Hinduism, or Shinto, my argument applies most readily to Western religions. In another article (Iannaccone, in press), I attempted to generalize the model to accommodate both collective and privately oriented religious practices.
The pleasure and edification that I derive from a Sunday service does not depend solely on what I bring to the service (through my presence, attentiveness, public singing, etc.); it also depends on how many others attend, how warmly they greet me, how well they sing or recite (in English, Latin, Hebrew, Arabic, etc.), how enthusiastically they read and pray, and how deep their commitments are. The collective side of religion encompasses numerous group activities such as listening to sermons, scriptural studies, testimonial meetings, liturgies, worship, hymn singing, and sacramental acts. However, it also extends to religious belief and religious experiences-particularly the most dramatic experiences such as speaking in tongues, miraculous healings, prophetic utterances, and ecstatic trances-all of which are more sustainable and satisfying when experienced collectively.
Free-Rider Problems
Like other collective activities, religion is susceptible to "free riding," a problem first analyzed by Mancur Olson (1965) and the subsequent focus of much social-scientific research. The problem arises whenever the members of a group receive benefits in proportion to their collective, rather than individual, efforts. Because each member benefits whether or not he contributes to the common cause, each has a strong incentive to minimize his own efforts and "free ride" off those of others. If enough members yield to this temptation, the collective activity will surely fail. Free riding has wrecked many an enterprise, from small charities to global environmental initiatives.
Although most scholars have tended to overlook the problems that religions have had with free riders, Mary Douglas (1986, pp. 23-24) cites her own anthropological work to prove that "the exception of religious organization is clearly a mistake." Indeed, she argues that it is "the history of religion [that] best bears out [Olson' s] theory. . . . It does not help our understanding of religion to protect it from profane scrutiny by drawing a deferential boundary around it. Religion should not be exempted at all."
Two types of free-rider problems are particularly common in religion. The first arises in mixed populations where levels of religious commitment vary from person to person. In any such group, people with low levels of religious commitment tend to free ride off those with higher levels; they tend to take more than they give. They may do so unintentionally. Nevertheless, if only because their lower commitment inclines them to participate and contribute less than others, their mere presence dilutes a group's resources, reducing the average level of participation, enthusiasm, energy, and the like. Heterogeneity can thus undermine in-tense fellowships and major undertakings. Lacking a way to identify and exclude free riders, highly committed people end up saddled with anemic, resource-poor congregations. The Appendix contains a formal, gametheoretic illustration of free riding in mixed groups.
A second type of free-rider problem persists even when members share a common level of commitment.5 Participation no longer varies from person to person, but the average level of participation remains suboptimal and hence inefficient.
To see why, recall that religious commodities are collectively produced. As I have noted, this implies that individual members benefit both from their own religious participation and from that of others. But it also implies the converse: when people participate, they provide benefits to others as well as to themselves. So, for example, a church member who attends regularly, sings wholeheartedly, greets others warmly, and testifies enthusiastically enhances not just his own spiritual life but also those of his fellow members. Economists refer to such side effects as "externalities." Externalities breed inefficiency because they do not enter into the self-interested decisions of strictly rational actors. Such actors maximize personal benefits net of personal costs, not social benefits net of social costs. It follows that harmful externalities like pollution abound, whereas beneficial externalities like charity, reporting crimes, and community action go begging. Powerful externalities pose serious threats to social systems and physical environments. It should come as no surprise that they also threaten religious groups. Most citizens contribute only a tiny fraction of their personal resources to charity or to community action. Is it any surprise that they behave similarly in church?
One need not look far to find an anemic congregation plagued by free-rider problems-a visit to the nearest liberal, mainline Protestant church usually will suffice. But case studies of cults and communes provide more striking examples. In such groups, which can only survive with high levels of commitment, the costs of free riding are laid bare.
Consider, for example, the Shakers' problems with transient members. These so-called "winter Shakers" would join Shaker communities in the late fall, obtain food and shelter throughout the winter, and then leave when employment opportunities had improved. Indeed, the Shakers' problems were not limited to transients. A Shaker journal written in 1870 complains of "Mary Ann Austin [who] came & took her 7 girls after our expenses of raising them" (Bainbridge 1982, p. 361) . Census data indicating 95% defection rates among members under the age of 20 corroborate these anecdotal accounts and underscore the magnitude of the problem (Bainbridge 1982) .
The Divine Principles (DP or Moonie) movement studied by Lofland in the 1960s encountered similar difficulties. Lofland describes the problems posed by "exploiters" whose motives for joining DP conflicted with or undermined the goals of the movement. Some merely "attempted to extract some nonreligious benefit from the DP's, such as inexpensive room and board, money, . . . or sex" (Lofland 1977, p. 152) . Others actually used DP as a base from which to recruit customers for their own, competing, spiritualist churches (p. 156).
Free riding was by no means unique to the Shakers and the DP movement. Hines (1983) claims that "social misfits," "personal dissension," and inadequate "screening" undermined most utopian colonies in California. "Commitment problems" likewise plagued most of the 19th-century communes studied by Kanter (1973; cf. Hall 1988) . Charles Guide's observation, quoted by Kanter (1973, pp. 157-58), is particularly apt: "Perhaps the gravest [peril] of all lies in the fact that these colonies are threatened as much by success as by failure. . . . If they attain prosperity they attract a crowd of members who lack the enthusiasm and faith of the earlier ones and are attracted only by self-interest." This perverse dynamic threatens all groups engaged in the production of collective goods, and it applies to enthusiasm, solidarity, and other social benefits no less than to material resources.
Reducing Free Riding
Although it is theoretically possible for religious groups to overcome their free-rider problems through screening and monitoring, such schemes prove unworkable in practice. For example, one theoretically ideal solution is for groups to "internalize" their externalities by charging substantial membership dues and then using those funds to subsidize individual participation. In other words, the group should pay people to participate fully. But this solution requires that individual behavior be accurately observed and appropriately rewarded. In reality, the aspects of religious participation that confer the greatest external benefits (effort, enthusiasm, solidarity, etc.) are intrinsically difficult to monitor and reward.6 The willingness to pay membership dues is a poor proxy for these qualities because income correlates weakly with most dimensions of religious com-mitment, and any attempt to directly subsidize the observable aspects of religious participation (such as church attendance) will almost certainly backfire. The Salvation Army will readily attest that the promise of free meals guarantees an audience of less than average commitment.7 How much greater would be the temptation to feign belief in the face of cash compensation? In practice, therefore, few churches reward attendance, sell their services, charge for memberships, or compensate any but a few full-time workers.8 There remains, however, an indirect solution to the free-rider problem. Instead of subsidizing participation, churches can penalize or prohibit alternative activities that compete for members' resources. In mixed populations, such penalties and prohibitions tend to screen out the less committed members. They act like entry fees and thus discourage anyone not seriously interested in "buying" the product. Only those willing to pay the price remain. The Appendix proves this result for a gametheoretic model.
Penalties and prohibitions can also raise average levels of group participation and group utility in homogeneous populations (whether they began as homogeneous or became so after the prohibitions persuaded the less committed members to leave). To see why, note that prohibiting an activity effectively increases its price, since the activity's full cost now includes the penalties that may be meted out if it is discovered. Increasing the price of an activity reduces the demand for it, but increases the demand for its substitutes, that is, for competing activities. Hence, a religious group can indirectly increase its members' levels of participation by prohibiting or otherwise increasing the cost of alternative activities. Governments often employ similar strategies. For example, many countries encourage the use of public transportation both directly, through subsidized fares, and indirectly, through special taxes and constraints on automobile usage.
Penalties and prohibitions increase group welfare if two conditions are satisfied. The first is that the inefficiency induced by free riding must be relatively large; otherwise costly efforts to reduce it are not worth the trouble. The second is that the activity being taxed, penalized, or prohibited must be a close substitute for the desired alternative; otherwise increasing the cost of the former will not significantly increase the demand for the latter. For the mathematical derivation of these results, see lannaccone (1992b).
It might at first seem that any group unable to monitor members' participation in its own activities will have an even harder time restricting their involvement in other activities, but this is not so. It is often much easier to observe and penalize mere involvement in competing groups than it is to accurately determine the level of involvement in one's own group. Alternatively, it may be possible to demand of members some distinctive, stigmatizing behavior that inhibits participation or reduces productivity in alternative contexts-having shaved heads, wearing pink robes, or being in an isolated location does the job quite effectively. Commenting on his religion's distinctive dress and grooming requirements, a Sikh put it thus: "The Guru wanted to raise a body of men who would not be able to deny their faith when questioned, but whose external appearance would invite persecution and breed the courage to resist it" (Singh 1953, p. 31).9
Restrictions on smoking, drinking, eating, sex, and other potentially private activities are harder to enforce, and it is possible that guilt, habit, and other self-enforcement mechanisms help keep members in line. Even in the absence of internal constraints, however, deception remains costly. A secret sexual liaison is not at all the same as an open relationship, private drinking from a hidden bottle is a poor substitute for social drinking at bars and parties, and a concealed smoking habit may be more trouble than it is worth. Restrictive religions can, and often do, raise the cost of deception by limiting the size of congregations, holding meetings in members' homes, and demanding that members routinely socialize with each other.
Costly strictures thus mitigate the externality problems faced by religious groups. Distinctive diet, dress, grooming, and social customs constrain and often stigmatize members, making participation in alternative activities more costly. Potential members are forced to choose whether to participate fully or not at all. The seductive middle ground is eliminated, and, paradoxically, those who remain find that their welfare has been increased. It follows that perfectly rational people can be drawn to decidedly unconventional groups. This conclusion sharply contrasts with the view, popular among psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, and the media, that conversion to deviant religious sects and cults is inherently pathological, the consequence of either psychological abnormality or coercive "brainwashing" (Robbins 1988 , pp. 72-89).1o
EVIDENCE AND APPLICATIONS
The proposed model does not merely "rationalize" strange behaviors and deviant demands. It also predicts the empirical correlates of strictness, extends Kelley's thesis, and throws new light on the hoary theme of church versus sect.
Measuring Strictness
To address these issues, one must first assess the relative "strictness" of different religions. Objective measures are hard to obtain, both because religious demands take many forms and because most data sources ignore the issue of cost," but comparisons based on expert judgment and common sense will suffice here.
Consider, for example, the three major Jewish denominations. It goes without saying that Orthodox Judaism imposes the greatest costs on its members and that Reform Judaism imposes the least. Conservative Judaism falls between these extremes, though it is generally closer to Reform than to Orthodox. One may verify this ranking any number of ways-by employing expert judgment, conventional wisdom, official doctrine, or observable practices-the results never change.
Although Protestant denominations prove harder to classify, some generalizations again lie beyond dispute. Scholars, citizens, journalists, and church members all agree that "sectarian" groups, like the Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, and Seventh Day Adventists, are stricter and more demanding than mainline denominations like the Episcopalians, Methodists, and the United Church of Christ. Indeed, the standard ranking begins with the "liberal," "mainline" denominations, and runs through "evangelicals," "fundamentalists," "pentecostals," and finally "sects." A large body of empirical research confirms the general validity of this ranking ( In order to assess this scale's reliability and to expand the set of denom- 12 Hoge surveyed expert opinion in an effort to identify the empirical determinants of church growth. In the current context, his data provide something approaching a "double blind" experiment, since neither he nor his subjects anticipated using the results to predict church attendance, contributions, or other individual-level behaviors. 13 One reviewer expressed concern that this item and my use of it fail to distinguish between "true costly stigma" and "mere distinctiveness." However, I model this difference as a matter of degree. Social or geographical isolation varies along a continuum (from wilderness communes to Amish communities to Orthodox Jewish enclaves to Catholic neighborhoods), as do restrictions on grooming, dietary habits, sexual behavior, family life, drug use, etc. The theory concerns any "opportunity" cost, with no sharp line between large and small or real and symbolic. Note also that, when asked to score denominations according to the strictness of their beliefs, the experts produced a ranking that correlates almost perfectly with the distinctiveness ranking (r = .91).
14 One might wonder whether the experts' judgments simply mirrored the conventional denominational ranking. But the experts ordered the denominations quite differently when asked about their strength of ethnic identity and their style of governance (Hoge 1979 ratings and the average standardized ratings of all other experts is .85. The experts' average score for each denomination can be read off the horizontal axis of figure 1.
A Theory of Church and Sect
I have shown that cost-based scales are reliable. They are also useful, yielding a formal theory of church and sect more elegant, general, and empirically fruitful than its predecessors.
Traditional theories of church and sect have been justly criticized as not being theories at all, but rather complex, multiattribute typologies that offer static descriptions at the expense of testable implications (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, pp. 19-23).'7 The ideal-typical sect might be defined as a religious organization with a highly committed, voluntary, and converted membership, a separatist orientation, an exclusive social structure, a spirit of regeneration, and an attitude of ethical austerity and demanding asceticism. The ideal-typical church would have its own complex list of attributes: birth-based membership, inclusiveness and universalism, hierarchical structures, an adaptive, compromising stance vis-a-vis the larger society, and so forth. Not withstanding a certain "intuitive rightness," such lists fail to accommodate the majority of realworld religions, provide limited insight into nonideal, "mixed-type" cases, and lack predictions or causal arguments linking one attribute to another.
In contrast, the present scheme is simple, unidimensional, and powerfully predictive. It derives from a model that characterizes numerous religious demands as functionally equivalent solutions to free-rider problems. Religions that demand similar levels of sacrifice should therefore display fundamental behavioral similarities, despite the peculiarities of their individual histories, theologies, and organizational structures. 18 Similarities do in fact appear when we group religions according to the (rated) stringency of their demands. Consider, for example, the summary statistics in 
Putting the Theory to Work
Unlike traditional typologies, the proposed theory of church and sect tells a causal story. It claims that a high-cost group maintains its strict norms of conduct precisely because they limit participation in competing activities and thereby raise levels of participation within the group.2' The theory thus predicts that increased strictness (or distinctiveness, or costliness) leads to higher levels of church attendance and church contributions, closer ties to the group, and reduced involvement in competing groups.
The observed patterns in tables 1 and 2 support this prediction. Relative to their more mainstream counterparts, members of sectarian groups-both Christian and Jewish-attend more religious services, contribute more money, and (in the Jewish case, at least) choose more of their closest friends from within their religion. They are also less involved in competing activities. They hold fewer memberships in outside groups, contribute less to outside causes, and have fewer outside friends. This last set of findings deserves special emphasis because it reverses a well-known individual-level pattern. The regressions in table 3 show that the group's impact persists even after controlling for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, such as age, income, sex, education, race, and marital status. Columns 1 and 5 regress attendance and contribution rates on background and SES variables alone. Columns 2 and 6 add a measure of denominational strictness or cost, the distinctiveness scores generated by the experts. In both regressions, the explanatory power of denominational distinctiveness is truly astonishing, particularly when one recalls that all the other variables are measured at the individual level. Distinctiveness works in the predicted direction, is highly significant, more than doubles R2 in the attendance regression, and increases R2 by half in the contribution equations. Columns 3 and 7 show that the signs, significance, and relative magnitudes of the estimated equation remain essentially unchanged under a nonlinear tobit specification (which combines features of both probit and OLS regression in order to account for censoring in the dependent variables). ous. Yet it took years of research before scholars would accept that a potential member's social ties predict conversion far more accurately than his or her psychological profile.
Economic ties work in much the same manner as social ties. There is little chance that a successful business executive will forsake all for a strict sect, let alone a wilderness commune. The opportunity costs are simply too great. But the costs are substantially less, and hence the odds of joining substantially higher, for people with limited secular opportunities, such as those with low wage rates, limited education, or minimal job experience. This prediction is consistent with the patterns observed in figure 4 and tables 1 and 2-sect members average the lowest income and education; members of the most churchlike denominations average the highest.
The prediction that sects tend to attract individuals with limited secular opportunities has two corollaries. First, classes of people experiencing relatively limited secular opportunities (such as minorities, women, and the young) are more likely than others to choose sect membership over mainline church membership. Second, a general decline in secular opportunities, such as that which occurs during recessions, will make sectarian groups more attractive relative to nonsectarian groups. Both corollaries are strongly supported by previous studies (reviewed in lannaccone 1988), and logistic regressions, available on request, show that being young, black, female, undereducated, or poor all significantly increase the odds of being a sect member.
Limits to Strictness
Kelley's argument would seem to imply that a church always benefits from increased strictness, no matter how strict it is already. The Presbyterians would grow faster if they become more like the Southern Baptists, who would, in turn, grow faster if they became more like the Mormons. In fact, Kelley himself has stated that "strong organizations are strict ... the stricter the stronger" (Kelley 1986, p. 95) .25 In contrast, the present model implies that organizational strictness displays diminishing returns and that the optimal amount of strictness will depend on the socioeconomic characteristics of the members.
To see this, recall that in the rational choice model, increased strictness adds to the attractiveness of a church only because its benefits outweigh its costs. The benefits take the form of greater group participation, commitment, or solidarity. These benefits can be quite large, since free riding is a serious problem. But they are not infinite. They must be set against the costs of strictness, costs that take the form of stigma, self-sacrifice, social isolation, and limited opportunities to earn "secular" rewards or to enjoy "worldly" pleasures. As a group becomes progressively more strict, it eventually reaches a point beyond which the additional benefits of increased strictness are outweighed by additional costs. Consider, for example, a group that has already isolated itself geographically, thereby eliminating all part-time members (at the cost of secular social ties and occupations). It is not at all clear that people who join such a group would also wish to submit to ritual disfigurement, vows of silence, regular fasting, or the rejection of all modern conveniences. Rather, it is clear that beyond some point increased strictness/ costliness must drive away virtually all current and potential members. Even though hundreds were willing to join the Bhagwan Rajneesh in Antelope, Oregon, few would have followed him to the Arctic Circle. For any target population of potential members, there will therefore exist an optimal level of strictness. Groups that exceed this level will tend to scare off many potential members with what are perceived as excessive demands. Groups that fall short of this level of strictness will suffer from free-rider problems and hence from a pervasive lack of commitment that leaves many potential members feeling that the group has little to offer.
Kelley's thesis and data thus address only one tail of a two-tailed phenomenon. Closer inspection should reveal the existence of another class of unsuccessful groups, those that are so strict and sectarian that they simply wither and die. Stark and Bainbridge's (1985) study of more than 400 American-born sects strongly confirms this prediction. Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Seventh Day Adventists notwithstanding, only 6% of all identifiable American sects are growing rapidly. Moreover, "nearly a third of all sects (32 percent) reached their high-water mark on the day they began. Twenty-one percent of these sects began to decline in membership from their very first day. Another 11 percent have not grown since formation" (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, pp. 133-34) . Relating these growth rates to the sects' levels of tension with society, Stark and Bainbridge (1985, p. 134) arrived at a conclusion that fits the rational choice model perfectly: "Many sects fail to grow (and are never transformed into churches) because their initial level of tension is so high as to cause their early social encapsulation. Once encapsulated, a sect may persist for centuries, depending on fertility and the ability to minimize defection, but it will rarely be able to recruit an outsider."
The Dynamics of Strictness
The notion of optimal strictness becomes especially important in a changing social environment. To remain strong, a group must maintain a certain distance or tension between itself and society. But maintaining this "optimal gap" means walking a very fine line in adjusting to social change so as not to become too deviant, but not embracing change so fully as to lose all distinctiveness.
This principle appears to characterize the Mormon church's response to the change in women's roles from 1940 through 1987. lannaccone and Miles's (1990) time-series analysis suggests that the Mormon church may have skirted the twin dangers of intransigence and loss of distinctiveness by a combination of initial resistance to social change followed ultimately by long-run accommodation. They conclude that "particularly in dynamic social environments churches must engage in a continuing balancing act, trading off between religious traditions and social norms.... A certain amount of tension with secular society is essential to success-the trick is finding, and maintaining, the right amount."
No group illustrates this continuing balancing act more dramatically than the Amish. As Kraybill (1989a Kraybill ( , 1989b ) has shown, the Amish have, throughout this century, engaged in "a dynamic process of negotiation which enables them to retain their ethnic identity while simultaneously adapting to economic pressures. The negotiated compromises permit: the use of tractors at the barn but not in the fields, the hiring of cars and trucks but not ownership, the use of telephones in shops but not in homes, the use of modern farm machinery, if pulled by horses, . . . and the use of hydraulic power in lieu of electricity" (Kraybill 1989b, p. 8) . 26 These examples of selective adaptation challenge our image of the rigid sect, dogmatically determined to resist change at all cost. Strategic, costbenefit calculations shape the "strange" practices of an extreme sect no less than they shape the "normal" practices of a mainstream church.
Knowing Where to Give In
A final extension to Kelley's thesis concerns the kinds of strict demands that benefit a church versus the kinds that backfire. Here the conclusion is straightforward: successful strictness, must involve the sacrifice of external (nongroup) resources and opportunities that the group can itself re-place. In other words, a group can afford to prohibit or put out of reach only those "commodities" for which it offers a close substitute. Arbitrary strictness will fail just as surely as excessive strictness. Indeed, being strict about the "wrong" things will be perceived as "excessive" strictness. It is not hard to identify examples. Cults and communes that isolate themselves geographically, thereby depriving their members of the normal means of production, must provide an internal productive economy based on farming, manufacture and trade, or the like. Sects that isolate their members socially must provide alternative social networks with ample opportunities for interaction, friendship, and status.
Climbing out on a speculative limb, I would suggest that, in the last generation, the Catholic church in America has suffered from a failure to abide by this principle. I suspect that Kelley identifies only one-half of the problem when he attributes Catholic membership losses to the Vatican II reforms, whereby the church " 'leaped over the wall' to join the liberal, 'relevant,' ecumenical churches" (1986, pp. 33-35). The other half of the problem is found in its hard-line positions on birth control and priestly celibacy. The Catholic church may have managed to arrive at a remarkable, "worst of both worlds" position-discarding cherished distinctiveness in the areas of liturgy, theology, and lifestyle, while at the same time maintaining the very demands that its members and clergy are least willing to accept.27
CONCLUSION
The strength of strict churches is neither a historical coincidence nor a statistical artifact. Strictness reduces free riding. It screens out members who lack commitment and stimulates participation among those who remain. Rational choice theory thus explains the success of sects, cults, and conservative denominations without recourse to assumed abnormality, irrationality, or misinformation. The theory also predicts differences between strict and lenient groups, distinguishes between effective and counterproductive demands, and demonstrates the need to adapt strict demands in response to social change.
The rational choice theory of organizational strictness accounts for empirical regularities that have fascinated sociologists for most of a century. Mainstream churches and extremist sects emerge as analytically distinct modes of religious organization rather than as ad hoc descriptive categories. The empirical correlates of sectarianism are derived as formal 27 This interpretation may help to harmonize the apparently divergent conclusions drawn by Kelley, who sees Vatican II as a costly sellout, and by Greeley (1985) , who sees Humanae Vitae as inducing a widespread reduction in Catholic commitment. consequences of a sectarian strategy aimed at enhancing group commitment.
Survey data strongly confirm the theory's key predictions. Members of stricter denominations devote more time and money to their religions and are more likely to describe themselves as strong members of their faith. They socialize more extensively with fellow members and are less involved in secular organizations. They have, on the average, lower incomes and less education. The patterns hold across the full spectrum of denominations, Christian and Jewish.
Other predictions await further research and better data. A study of unsuccessful sects is needed to test the theory's prediction that too much strictness causes just as much harm as too little. A study of the content of sectarian demands would help test the prediction that successful groups must provide substitutes for the external rewards that they effectively prohibit. Results from studies like these might also indicate whether the rational choice model is more consistent with observation than models derived from alternative social-psychological assumptions. Like Kelley's original study, this article has addressed the issue of church growth only indirectly. I have tended to assume that "strong" churches-churches with high rates of commitment, participation, and contributions-will find it much easier to achieve high rates of growth. This assumption certainly seems reasonable and is supported by empirical studies of church growth (Iannaccone et al. 1993 ). However, it blurs the distinction between necessary and sufficient. In commercial markets, the strongest firms are not always the fastest growing. Highly profitable businesses sometimes choose to maintain their current size and forgo an increased market share. The Amish have pursued an analogous strategy in the religious marketplace. The current, static version of the strict church model does not adequately address this distinction. A dynamic version is needed to clarify the relationship between the strength and growth.
Rational choice theories of religious behavior are new, provocative, and relatively undeveloped. This article has explored one such theory and has thereby sought to show how costly, apparently unproductive, demands can strengthen an organization and benefit its members. The relative ease with which it has integrated Kelley's strict church thesis, traditional church-sect typologies, and the basic features of American denominationalism suggests that further work is well worth the effort. Free riding.-Consider now the problems that arise when different types of people are able to mix. We have seen that a group consisting solely of type C people can maintain high levels of participation, and so be "strong," whereas a group of type U people tends toward low levels of participation, and so is "weak." (This result has nothing to do with differing levels of self-interest, rationality, or altruism among the two groups. Rather it depends entirely on the different costs and benefits they derive from group participation.) In practice, however, these two groups have difficulty existing side by side. The payoff structures are such that everyone prefers to be in groups where the other members maintain high levels of participation. Hence, type U people will tend to migrate from figure A2 . Examining the payoffs, we find that the type U person has the same unconditional incentive to free ride as in figure Al. But if the type U person maintains a low level of participation, the type C person has no incentive to do otherwise. Hence, the presence of type U people undermines what would otherwise be a strong group of type C people. The less committed people free ride, holding back resources of time, energy, and so forth from the group. And, faced with this free riding, even the committed members find it no longer worth their bother to participate fully (because their contributions to the group are effectively "stolen" by free riders). The situation therefore tends to degenerate until no one is participating fully. This result is inefficient because the type Cs end up worse off than before (earning a payoff of four rather than six) whereas the type Us end up no better off (since they earn two either way). Free riding has made all groups weak.
A costly solution.- Figure A4 shows how seemingly gratuitous costs can mitigate the free-rider problem found in matrix A3. The cost consists of a uniform one-unit membership penalty. Members pay the penalty regardless of their participation level. Hence, all payoffs are one less than in the original mixed-group matrix, A3. If uncommitted people join this group they will make it just as weak as any of the others they join (since low participation is still their dominant strategy), but having done so they will find themselves in the top left cell earning a one-unit payoff (their standard two-unit payoff minus the one-unit membership cost). Since this one-unit payoff is less than they earn in a standard weak group,
